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Assessing the Democratic Value of Civil 
Society Engagement in the European Union 
 
Thorsten Hüller and Beate Kohler-Koch 
MZES, University of Mannheim and International Graduate School of the Social Sciences, Bremen 
 
 
 
 
 
In the last decade, various authors as well as the European Commission have 
‘rhetorically’ strengthened the idea of fostering democracy and legitimacy by 
improving civil society involvement (Kohler-Koch/Finke 2007; Smismans 
2006). Maybe the involvement of civil society organisations in EU affairs is 
only one of many options to democratize the European Union (Kohler-
Koch/Rittberger 2007) and if this is the case, it is one which can either foster 
and strengthen European democracy, or favour undisclosed elite negotiations, 
as it is far from obvious that all kinds of interest groups incorporation 
automatically have a positive effect on democratic quality. 
Since the vigorous critique of the pluralist theory in the 1960s, the scientific 
discourse about democratic functions of voluntary associations was rather 
sceptical. This changed only in the face of the political transition of the 
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Eastern European countries, where strongly normative and affirmative views 
grew with the concept of civil society (Glenn 2001). Today this democratic 
optimism is not linked any longer to the upheaval of the people against 
illegitimate and oppressive government, rather a wide range of functions 
advancing good democratic governance is attributed to civil society, new 
social movements and voluntary associations. On the European level this 
discussion was rather slow on the uptake (see Finke 2007). 
Prima facie it might seem puzzling to face such evaluative variance over such 
a short period of time. But it is the elusive and multifaceted concept both of 
civil society and democracy which opens up the room for very different 
understandings. A sound assessment of the (potential) democratic value has to 
deal with at least three unrelenting basic problems and their specific 
interrelations. The central problem is the contested notion of the key terms: 
What do ‘democracy’, ‘civil society’, and ‘EU’ precisely mean? Not enough 
having to deal with three contested concepts, we have to face three additional 
inter-relative problems: How can the well-known instruments to measure 
democratic quality taken from comparative government research be applied 
to the EU? What are the possible democratic functions or values of civil 
society engagement and/or involvement? Which functions can be relevant 
for the EU? 
The title indicates an empirical question, but the main problems to solve are 
of a theoretical nature: Only when this preparatory work is done, we can - 
with the help of a theoretical model - investigate the democratic quality of 
civil society engagement in the EU empirically. 
So this paper is mostly on ‘asking the right questions’: First, a normative 
conception of democracy is outlined, which is in our view appropriate to 
measure and assess the changing quality of European democratic performance 
(1). Then the interpretations of civil society and its latent democratic 
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functions are introduced (2). In a next step, different conceptions of the EU 
and respective roles of civil society involvement are discussed because the 
potential democratic function of civil society varies with the conceptions of 
the EU as polity (3). Based on these deliberations we develop an analytical 
model of the ‘civil society-EU democracy’ relation and specify the relevant 
questions in order to measure its democratic performance (4). Finally, we 
discuss the implications of our theoretical model for empirical research and 
try to give some very rough indications concerning the overall democratic 
performance of the civil society involvement in the European Union (5). 
On Democracy 
Reviewing the normative conceptions of democracy and the attempts to 
measure democratic quality empirically, we see many different normative 
conceptions and analytical designs.1 In order to capture the differences, it has 
been suggested to set apart three dimensions of contested values: the relation 
of the fundamental values of liberty and political equality, the desired 
extensity and quality of citizen participation, and the normative ideal of will 
formation. 
Along the liberty-equality divide we face roughly three positions: the liberal 
democratic position, which puts emphasis on personal autonomy by 
favouring an (iterative) consensus model (Ackerman 1989, Riker 1982), the 
strong egalitarian position arguing in favour of the position of a median voter 
or deliberator normally enacted through the application of majority rule (see 
Dahl 1989 or Waldron 1990 for aggregative views), and the third position 
 
1 For a historical account on different conceptions of democracy, see Held (1987). For 
contemporary normative conceptions, see the broad overview by Cunningham (2002), but 
also the more systematic debates e.g. by Christiano (1996), Dahl (1989), Shapiro (2003) and 
Weale (2007). 
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tries specifically to reconcile individual autonomy and political equality as far 
as possible (Rawls 2001)2. 
A second divide in democratic theory concerns the direct participation of 
citizens. Since Rousseau one camp of theorists argues in favour of extensive 
and/or intensive participation (Bachrach 1967; Barber 1984), others are more 
sceptical due to normative and/or empirical considerations (Kornhauser 1959; 
Sartori 1962). 
A third divide, which has been re-discovered in the last twenty years, 
concerns the ideal of will-formation: Is democracy about fairly aggregating 
existing preferences , is it a power game or should it be a matter of 
deliberation and convincing arguments (Habermas 1996; Macedo 1999; 
Shapiro 2003). 
The three contested normative dimensions of democracy are also mirrored in 
the literature, which tries to measure democratic quality empirically.3 It goes 
without saying that assessing the democratic quality of any political system, 
including the EU, has to relate to a specific understanding of democracy. To 
put it differently: What normative kind of democracy provides us with the 
yardstick for measurement? 
Though political theory provides sound reasons for arguing in favour of one 
or the other normative position, we will not engage in this debate, but rather 
make a choice from a ‘contextualised’ point of view. It is ‘contextualised’ in 
                                                 
2 A prominent version of this third approach is the ideal of “non-domination” (Pettit 1997) or 
“minimizing domination” (Shapiro 2003). 
3 To point only at a few differences here: With respect to the first divide, most authors restrict 
their indicators for measuring political equality in the political process, but see e.g. the Polity 
IV project by Jaggers and Gurr (http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/polity.html) who focus 
in addition on constitutional restrictions. Some authors are strongly opposed to the idea of 
making actual participation a relevant indicator (Lauth 2004: 338ff.), but others are equally 
strong in favour of it (Vanhanen 1997). And parallel to the mainstream of conceptions 
measuring aggregative democracy, there is a rapidly growing literature measuring deliberative 
democracy (e.g. Steenbergen et al. 2003). 
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two respects: first, we take account of the system properties of the EU and 
second, we relate it to our research question which is concerned with the 
involvement of civil society and, thus, with the process of policy making and 
not with the constitutionalisation of basic rights.4 
We argue that in the multi-level system of the EU the liberal democratic idea 
of augmenting the personal autonomy of the individual citizen is best secured 
at the national and local, and not at the EU level of decision making.5 The 
iterative consensus model can only contribute to the enhancement of 
personal autonomy under conditions of an open public space where 
individual voices can be heard. Again, the multi-level character of the EU, 
the diversity and size of the European political arenas run contrary to such 
ambitions. Furthermore, the EU system is by definition a federal system 
which gives priority to the representation of collective units. Individual 
equality is under similar constraints. Due to the federal principle, territorial 
communities have priority and, consequently, individuals do not enjoy equal 
political weight in EU decision making. The deliberate overrepresentation of 
small nations is not an issue when observers deplore biased representation in 
the EU. This relates to the unequal representation of functional or political 
interest at the inter-individual level. It is the heavy bias towards the 
representation of economic interests in EU decision-making, which has 
always been criticised as violating democratic principles. 
With respect to the aggregation-deliberation divide we argue in favour of the 
deliberative approach. The main reason is again the multi-level character of 
the EU. When the emphasis is on the aggregation of existing preferences, the 
 
4 For a discussion why contextualized answers for the democratic question are necessary, see 
Abromeit (2004). Even if we assume a general ideal of democracy, the conditions of 
application make important differences at the practical level desirable. 
5 Human, political and social rights are constitutional rights at member state levels which have 
been secured for decades by the European Convention for Human Rights. The EU Charta for 
Human Rights brings little added value. Even more important, to comply with these rights is a 
pre-condition for becoming a member of the EU, in the first place. 
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outcome is suboptimal. This can be observed regularly in international, inter-
governmental negotiations. We argue that a trans-national discourse will 
more likely produce a more differentiated view on European problems and a 
broader range of appropriate and accepted problem-solutions. Irrespective of 
our preference for the deliberative approach, we intend to measure the 
participatory quality of civil society involvement both, in relation to interest 
aggregation and deliberation.  
Concerning the participation-representation-divide in democratic theory, we 
take the view that both extreme positions are rather implausible for empirical 
as well as normative reasons: There cannot be a proper democracy without a 
significant degree of citizens’ participation, but under conditions of modern 
societies inclusive and permanent participation is unattainable. But if 
democracy most basically means ‘the people rules’, these restrictions cannot 
abandon the core principle of political equality (see Dahl 2006). So what is 
needed is a normative conception of political equality for “stand by-citizens” 
(Amnå 2007), for citizens who sometimes engage more intensively in political 
affairs, but most of the time and with respect to most issues remain only (and 
at best) the audience on the gallery. In the stand-by mode they read their 
newspaper, listen to their friends, neighbours etc. and watch nation-wide TV 
news, but they normally do not actively participate in politics. To assess if the 
EU citizens’ (can) perform adequately, two issues have to be investigated 
separately: Firstly, the quality of the information cues via mass media and/or 
the performance of intermediary institutions, such as political parties, civil 
society organisations etc.. Since average citizens will not participate directly in 
the European political process, they have to rely on transmission belts of 
information in order to learn about relevant political decisions and conflicts. 
Secondly, the opportunities offered for political participation have to meet 
the receptiveness and the capacity of citizens. Intermediary institutions have a 
democratic function in so far as, in the long term perspective, they lower the 
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activation thresholds and enhance the readiness for active participation and, 
this way, turn citizens from an ‘off’-mode’ to a ‘stand by mode’ in a given 
situation. 
So what is an appropriate normative notion of democracy for the EU, which is 
open for deliberative processes and which respects political equality without 
assuming full citizens’ participation? Our suggestion is the following: A 
political system is democratic if the essential decisions in the system are generated in 
public and if mechanisms exist which link these decisions in an egalitarian (or: 
reciprocal) way, effectively to their members. 
A few explications are in place here. A political system is defined as a societal 
association which makes and implements collectively binding decisions for 
their members who have no real individual exit-option. And the normative 
criteria which qualify a system as ‘democratic’ have to be specified further. In 
our approach we will refer to the principles of reciprocity, publicity, and 
accountability.6 
Political Equality as Reciprocity. Democracy necessitates citizens being 
treated as (political) equals (Dahl 2006, Saward 1998). But what precisely 
should be treated equally? Empirical preferences, individually enlightened 
preferences or morally justified preferences? And based on which criteria do 
we decide on the quality of preferences? An elegant way out is to ask for 
reciprocity as the core principle in a process of will-formation. 
Reciprocity demands an ‘other-regarding’ behaviour and the justification of 
political claims with ‘good reasons’, which means that they are accepted as 
being rational and legitimate. The process and output should be “mutually 
acceptable” (Gutmann/Thompson 1996: 55). 
                                                 
6 For a more comprehensive defence of these normative principles and a discussion of 
alternative normative conceptions of deliberative democracy, see Hüller (2005: chapter 3). 
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How do we know reciprocity when we see it? First, all relevant political 
claims must reach the political forum. Second, priority will be given to 
considerations supported by collectively shared fundamental substantive 
standards, whereas arguments based on status and power and emotional 
appeals will be devalued. If there is a moral disagreement, in which several 
fundamental standards are contested, there should be procedures at place to 
morally reconcile or accommodate these different norms as far as possible. 
Conflicts about the validity of empirical statements should be resolved by 
relying on uncontested methods of producing evidence. The idea behind this 
principle of reciprocity is to approximate a ‘justificatory ideal’, where the 
actors rely on the ‘force of sufficiently justifiable arguments’ 
(Gutmann/Thompson 1996: cp. 2; Rawls 1999). 
The idea of reciprocity (just as the idea of justice) is inseparably linked to the 
principle of political equality (see e.g. Dworkin 1978, Gosepath 2004) and it 
can be equally applied to a representative and a participatory approach. What 
is necessary is that everybody’s (justified) claims and positions are taken into 
fair consideration. Whether affected citizens should present and defend their 
claims themselves or not is not a matter of principle, but a matter of 
pragmatism. It is an open empirical question if representation or direct 
participation will foster deliberative political equality more successfully – and 
the answer might change depending on the context.7 
Political equality (and for deliberative democrats more precisely: reciprocity) 
is the core normative principle. Publicity and accountability have a more 
instrumental character since their importance is closely linked to the empirical 
conditions of modern societies. 
                                                 
7 It seems to be fair to expect that both extremes of the participatory and the representative 
ideal are not attainable in modern societies. Whereas the participatory ideal is (and has always 
been) naïve from a sociological point of view, the pure representative ideal underestimates the 
functional need for citizen activities, such as popular instruction and control via elections and 
referenda, public deliberations, demonstrations etc. (for a prominent diagnosis, see Barber 
1984: part I), and it overestimates the good-will of the political elite, or both. 
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Publicity. When can political actions, policies or politics be regarded as 
public? In a decision making process we could think of publicity in a weak 
sense, meaning that political actions, documents and decisions are published 
and accessible at low costs. If these conditions are met, we speak of publicity 
in the sense of transparency.8 A stronger conception of publicity would take 
transparency as a necessary but not sufficient condition. Here, an action, 
policy or political process only counts as public if it is an issue in public 
debate: everybody knows it and everybody knows that everybody knows it 
(Luban 1996: 170). In that sense, publicity means common public knowledge. 
This kind of publicity we find in various aspects of Rawls’ “idea of public use 
of reason” and “public justification” (Rawls 2001: § 9, §26; 1999). 
Now what is the appropriate normative principle for a democratic theory for 
generally attentive, but with respect to most actual (routine) political 
processes absent ‘stand by-citizens’? Our answer is – very roughly – a 
combination of both. Without transparency of the political process, even 
intermediary organisations would not be able to exert a reliable political 
‘control’.9 Transparency is the necessary condition to subject politically 
contested issues to a wider public debate. The important democratic function 
of civil society organisations is the monitoring of a basically transparent policy 
process and in stimulating the awareness of the general public of relevant 
political issues. 
The need for publicity concerns, first of all, what Rawls (1993: Lecture 6, § 
5, 2001: § 9) has called “constitutional essentials”. Beyond certain substantial 
rights, fundamental procedural rights and competences are a core element of 
this idea: If citizens do not know how the political system works, what their 
                                                 
8 For a normative conception of “weak publicity”, see Christiano (2008 forthcoming: chap. 2) 
9 Therefore, transparency has been introduced to European politics as an institutional cure for 
the deficiencies in multi-level accountability. But this does not imply an obligation that every 
political act and process must be transparent. There are plausible normative as well as pragmatic 
exemptions from the transparency rule (see Gutmann/Thompson 1996: cp.3, Naurin 2007). 
154 Thorsten Hüller and Beate Kohler-Koch 
 
rights are and how to use them, they can not act as ‘stand-by citizen’ but are 
simply excluded from political decisions.10 Second, although for good reasons 
most of the political processes and decisions operate in a ‘routine’ mode and, 
irrespective of being transparent, pass by unnoticed, they operate in the 
shadow of publicity. Not the number or the intensity of public debates 
indicate the democratic quality of a political system, but the institutionalised 
mechanisms, such as party competition, which contain the risk that routine 
operations will go public. The system has to remain permeable for public 
discussions about occurring problems and conflicts (Habermas 1996: cp. 
VIII). 
Transparency is the necessary though not sufficient prerequisite for a 
functioning democracy. If it is sufficient in routine politics, it is inter alia 
dependent on well functioning mass media, on convenient administrative 
culture, and not the least on the norm orientation of the ruling elite and the 
scrutiny of intermediary associations. The latter ensure a more or less 
systematic monitoring of normal politics, asking for justification and 
maintaining the option of a transition to publicity. The respective 
contributions of civil society organisations are at the core of our research 
interest. 
Accountability. In democratic theory the notions of control, responsiveness, 
responsibility and accountability all focus on the appropriate relation between 
the rulers and the ruled, or rather the citizens and their representatives. 
Neither the term control nor responsiveness can sufficiently grasp the binding 
                                                 
10 Empirically, political education or civic literacy is unequally distributed and will be so for the 
time being. The point here is that there have to be certain kinds of personal political 
capabilities (Sen) to make it possible that citizens can exert their democratic function. 
Especially “procedural competences” (Buchstein) (i.e. knowing the rules of the political 
‘game’) seem to be on average significantly less cultivated on the European level than they are 
on the national one. To be clear, we do not talk about the intellectual capacities of the 
European citizens, but about their ability to assess and to take a position in the political 
processes on the EU level. 
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of rulers and the ruled. ‘Control’ bears the connotation of someone who 
supervises the political processes all the way down. But this would make the 
whole differentiation between citizens and representatives unnecessary. If 
every political act was accompanied and reviewed by the people, they would 
not ‘stand by’, but do the entire work themselves. As already mentioned, 
there are severe empirical restrictions to such an ideal. And there might also 
be certain cases, policies and polities, where it is not desired, that the people 
have such a direct hold on policy formulation (see e.g. Pettit 2004). 
Mere responsiveness – the mirroring of empirical preferences in political 
decisions - is also not an appropriate and sufficient standard for the desirable 
binding of representatives’ actions. Responsiveness may be an inclination or a 
fact of politics. In both cases it ought to be a characteristic feature of 
democratic representation. However, it can also occur under patriarchal or 
populist autocratic rule. Only when rights are institutionalised and 
institutional mechanisms are in place obliging political representatives to be 
responsive, the factual responsiveness of political representatives may be rated 
as an attribute of a democratic system. Even then, representatives’ 
responsiveness to citizens’ preferences is only a viable indicator of democratic 
will formation under the assumption of steady and consistent individual and 
collective preferences. In addition, the democratic quality depends on the 
requirements of reciprocity. 
Expressions like responsibility and accountability are not flawed in that way. 
Unlike the term control, they give room for representatives to act themselves, 
and unlike responsiveness, both allow for “deliberative uptakes” (Bohman) 
within political processes. 
According to Marc Bovens, “accountability is a relationship between an actor and 
a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her 
conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face 
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consequences” (Bovens 2007: 450). Thus, accountability is about justification 
that embraces both ideational and material aspects. Representatives have to 
justify the appropriateness of their positions with respect to the underlying 
value judgements and norms. They also have to argue convincingly that they 
act in the interest of the represented and they have to prove that they have 
taken into consideration the legitimate claims of everybody affected. They 
will be held accountable on the grounds of principled belief systems and they 
will face consequences on the grounds of policy output and policy outcome. 
Political accountability (as compared to legal or administrative accountability) 
is a judgement which indicates ‘displeasure’ and not the violation of given 
standards or deviant behaviour (Bovens 2007: 463). 
The three normative principles elaborated above, reciprocity, publicity and 
accountability, are at the core of a principle-driven approach to measure the 
democratic quality of political institutions. The core assumption is: The more 
political decision making processes (from setting the political agenda to policy 
formulation, decision making and implementation) meet these standards, the 
more democratic is the political system. 
On Civil Society and Democracy 
The current use of ‘civil society’ (and similar expressions) is as vague and 
open as the term democracy (Chambers and Kymlicka 2002). Here, civil 
society is a separate sphere beyond the spheres of private life, the economy 
and the state and, consequently, operates according to a different logic that is 
not dominated by emotional attachment, profit seeking, or the subordination 
to power. Civil society is upheld by associations which are organised to 
different degrees, and which are active in and take issue with quite diverse 
fields of cultural, religious, political, social, economic and many other fields of 
life (Warren 2001). 
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Parallel to the concepts concerning the virtues of participation (see above), 
there are at least two major strands of literature expecting democracy related 
functions of civil society organisations, which we refer to as associative 
democracy and associational life.11 Here, associative democracy refers to all 
settings where (1) civil society organisations are ‘incorporated’ into the 
political system, be it that certain authoritative power is delegated to collective 
non-state actors, or to the joint decision making of representative groups of 
organizations and they (2) should perform certain democratizing functions. 
Apart from self-regulation, associative democracy attributes civil society actors 
the role of intermediaries. They are expected to serve as transmission belts, 
either from the citizen to the state which makes significant use of the 
expertise, claims, support channelled by civil society actors, or from the realm 
of politics to the citizens by providing information and knowledge. 12 
The second strand of literature does not focus on the direct and immediate 
effect of associations on the democratization of a political system, but is 
interested in the indirect and medium-term formative consequences of 
associational life. The social capital approach, in particular, has triggered an 
increasing research interest in the effects of active membership in associations 
on (other) political activities and interests and on the acquisition of political 
skills and virtues.13 This paper is concerned only with the first concept. 
Associative democracy differs from the broader concept of democratic 
participation since not citizens as individuals are participating in the political 
process, but delegates of civil society organizations. With respect to the 
democratic question it is most important to be aware of the different 
 
11 It goes without saying that these democratizing functions are contested as well (see Fung 
2003). 
12 For overviews about different institutional settings and possible democratic functions, see 
Cohen/Rogers (1995), Hüller (2005: cp. 10), Warren (2001). 
13 See e.g. Putnam (1993) or Skocpol (2004) for influential contemporary approaches. For a 
critical evaluation of this strand, see Theiss-Morse/Hibbing (2005). 
158 Thorsten Hüller and Beate Kohler-Koch 
 
intermediary roles which are connected to civil society organisations (Greven 
2007). From a normative perspective, the demos (citizens or affected persons) 
is the only unit of reference, and not associations. If civil society organizations 
are supposed to have a central function within democratic decision making, 
we need to make a two-dimensional analysis. One dimension has to focus on 
the political interaction between the centre of the political system and the 
civil society organizations and the other dimension on the interaction 
between the demos (however defined) and the civil society organizations. 
Quite evidently, in most empirical works the second dimension is at best 
under-investigated and also underdeveloped theoretically.14 
Two kinds of mechanisms can be differentiated, which might have 
democratizing functions. In a ‘top-down’ perspective, civil society organizations 
might systematically observe more or less transparent but nevertheless ‘veiled’ 
political processes and provide their constituencies or the general public with 
relevant information, explaining or criticizing what happens ‘up there’. Such 
associative monitoring would make political processes more public and, as a 
consequence, more accountable (see e.g. Fung 2003: 522). 
Democratization might also work the other way round, if a more egalitarian 
chain of input or ‘bottom-up’ mechanism was strengthened by intermediary 
associations. If associations have many members or a wide constituency to 
whom they are responsive, and if these associations work in very different 
‘local’ contexts, then their representatives might represent hidden, but 
relevant information as well as different perspectives (Williams 1998; Young 
2000). So they might bring expertise and claims and a diversity of views into 
the decision making process. As a consequence, the knowledge base (about 
                                                 
14 For an interesting theoretical approach reflecting on this double-step, see Nanz/Steffek 
(2006) and, of course, Habermas (1990, 1996: cp. VIII). But at least Habermas’ model can not 
simply be applied to the EU, as there is not a properly functioning general public sphere, 
which serves a prominently role in his view (see below, part 3). 
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relevant political preferences, claims and possible solutions) for political 
decisions can be extended and this is a pre-condition for egalitarian 
deliberations and decisions (see Fung 2003: 523ff.). 
The effectiveness of both mechanisms is to a large extent an empirical 
question. It would be not enough to prove that civil society organizations 
bring up a variety of issues and claims, but that they are to a certain degree 
representative for the demos.15 Furthermore, the input from civil society 
organizations can only be rated as a democratic added value when it has an 
impact on the decision making process.16 
The connotations of ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ mechanisms might be 
closer to aggregative conceptions of democracy, but some – however 
mediated and deliberatively enlightened - connection between the demos and 
the more representative acts of decision making have to be present in 
deliberative conceptions of associative democracy, as well (for different 
variants considering this, see Habermas 1996: cp. VIII, Cohen/Rogers 1995, 
Nanz/Steffek 2006). Even more important, both the top-down and the 
bottom-up mechanisms have to be visible and significant in the European 
political practice. 
Civil Society, Democracy, and the EU17 
The potential contribution of civil society to EU democracy is underspecified 
in social science research for different reasons. It is not long ago that the 
general theoretical debate has started and, consequently, theory guided 
 
15 There is a long literature on organisational self-interests, the possible democratic 
malfunctions of group pluralism and neo-corporatism. 
16 To be sure, for deliberative theorists it is very difficult to specify the desired impact. Nanz 
and Steffek (2005) have argued for ‘responsiveness’. But as the search is for reasonable or 
generalizable decisions, we either have to assume that all claims from civil society organizations 
are of such a kind (what is implausible) or we have to qualify the desired responsiveness (see 
above, part 1). 
17 This part draws on Kohler-Koch (2007). 
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empirical research is just at its beginnings (Smismans 2006; Finke 2007; Della 
Sala/Ruzza 2007). We argue that the deficiencies of the present day discourse 
are not just a question of lacking maturity of research, but have to be 
attributed to the uncertainties about the nature of the EU. In the literature 
we are faced with different images of the European polity. We suggest three 
analytically distinct frames which combine civil society and the EU in specific 
ways: Three concepts attributing a distinctive role to civil society as carrier of 
democracy which correspond to three different understandings of the nature 
of the EU system. We find these frames by digesting the broad literature on 
civil society, EU governance and democracy and categorize it in view of the 
theoretical debate of recent decades.18  
Three ideal type conceptions: The nature of the EU is still contested both in its 
present form and even more so concerning its future development. We 
distinguish three ideal type images of the EU, which are present in the 
political and the academic debate. They provide quite distinct frames for the 
incorporation of civil society and also are usually associated with different 
understandings of what civil society engagement in the EU is about. 
The first conception originates from the governance turn in the analysis of 
the European Union. In this perspective, the EU equals the modern state 
which has lost its steering capacity and strives to attain problem-solving 
effectiveness by close cooperation with non-state actors. In the EU non-
hierarchical forms of decision making are said to be even more pertinent 
because decision making powers are allocated to different territorial levels and 
dispersed to functionally segmented arenas. A system of ‘network governance’ 
(Kohler-Koch 1999) evolves bringing together the relevant state and societal 
actors. To induce reluctant actors such as member state administrations, 
                                                 
18 For a recent review on the literature on civil society see Finke (2007); for a review on 
governance see Kohler-Koch/Rittberger (2006); on EU democracy see, for example, the 
edited volumes by Eriksen/Fossum (2000) and Kohler-Koch/Rittberger (2007). 
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economic actors and interest groups to agree to EU harmonisation, new 
modes of governance have been introduced such as the ‘open method of 
coordination’. The trade mark of these new modes of governance is that all 
actors that are potential target groups or may support or obstruct the success 
of a regulation are included in the process of defining policy goals and 
instruments. 
Civil society is an underdeveloped concept in this governance approach. It 
comes under the heading of ‘participatory governance’ and suggests including 
‘stakeholders’ in the arrangement of ‘public-private partnerships’. The 
concept is based on the normative supposition that all those who are affected 
by a political regulation should have the right to participate in the decision. It 
is, in addition, supported by the functional belief that those who are affected 
can also bring relevant knowledge to improve the policy decision. Since 
regulatory and not redistributive policies are prevalent in the EU, it is 
suggested that not interest but the capacity to contribute to ‘best solutions’ 
should be the relevant criterion for participation.19 
In the standard accounts of governance approaches, the democratic question 
is under-developed, but a systematic incorporation as intended by Schmitter 
immediately raises a trade-off problem: open and inclusive participation 
might have constraints on effectiveness. But it was precisely because of the 
effectiveness of the arrangements why participatory governance was 
supported in the first place. Since the concepts that portray the EU as a 
system of governance say little about EU democracy, we will not analyse 
them any further. 
The second conception sees the EU in a state of constitutionalisation that is 
both, a process of polity building and of “social constituency building” 
 
19 In Philippe C. Schmitter’s concept ‘holders’ are defined more broadly: “they possess some 
quality or resource that entitles them to participate”, but already rights that are attached to 
membership is such a quality (Schmitter 2002: 62). 
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(Fossum/Trenz 2006). The EU is on the verge from a multi-level system of 
governance that was mainly relying on the legitimacy of its constituent units, 
i. e. the member states, to a system of authoritative decision making in its 
own rights. This calls not only for the institutionalisation of procedures of 
democratic participation and accountability, but also for the emergence of a 
trans-national European civil society.  
Whereas some authors associate a sense of social cohesion and solidarity with 
civil society (Walzer 1995), the main discourse is inspired by the idea of 
deliberative democracy in the tradition of Jürgen Habermas. The essential 
ingredient of democracy is a ‘political public sphere’, “a communication 
structure rooted in the lifeworld through the associational network of civil 
society” (Habermas 1996: 359). In this reading, civil society is “composed of 
those more or less spontaneously emerging associations, organisations, and 
movements that, attuned to how societal problems resonate in the private life 
sphere, distil and transmit such reactions in amplified form to the public 
sphere” (Habermas 1996: 367). Civil society is seen as being distinct from 
self-interested lobby groups. 
This normatively very attractive conception, which was developed by 
Habermas for national political systems, has at least two kinds of deficiencies: 
There is empirical evidence and theoretical support that precisely the most 
autochthonous civil society actors were the least deliberative, other-regarding 
in public discourses.20 
                                                 
20 Gerhards/Neidhardt/Rucht (1998) have shown this for the civil society contributions to 
public discourses accompanying a political decision about the abortion law in Germany. There 
might be at least two reasons for this: First these associations are highly voluntary and 
homogenous (compared to churches or political parties). Broad other-regarding behaviour has 
to be paid with a loss in membership and support. Both, in case of homogenous groups and 
under the conditions of deliberations about generally accepted values, there is a tendency of 
the radicalization of preferences in the course of deliberation (see Sunstein2000; Warren 2001). 
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Much more problematic for an empirical oriented research is that the 
necessary conditions for the functioning of this normative model, such as the 
democratic constitutionalization, a European wide public sphere, and the 
spontaneous emergence of civil society have not yet materialised at EU level. 
It is quite another thing to talk about national public spheres and public 
discourses than to presuppose a general European public sphere. There are no 
European quality newspapers, no European TV etc. and the Europeanisation 
of national media is still underdeveloped (see Brüggemann et al. 2007). If a 
controversial topic spurs a political debate, it may generate issue specific trans-
national communications, but the politisation is mostly limited to one policy 
area and the ensuing segmented public spheres do not add up to a general 
political public and, therefore, are not a substitute for an open democratic 
space (Eriksen 2002). Another deficit concerns the state of European civil 
society. There is ample empirical evidence that - compared to the nation state 
– civil society organisations on EU level are significantly less independent or 
autochthonous (Michel 2008). Thus, two core elements of this democratic 
model, a trans-national political public sphere and an associational network of 
civil society, are not functioning adequately on the European level. 
Consequently, we will not consider this conception any further. 
The third conception attributes to the EU the quality of a political system 
closely cooperating with civil society organisations. The EU is exerting 
government functions without having a government. The ruling institutions 
are autonomous but highly interdependent and in different ways and to 
different degrees politically responsible. The policy making process is spurred 
by the Commission and policy output is dependent on the negotiated 
compromise between all actors entailed. It is a political system on the move, 
with expanding membership and a constant, though mainly incremental 
deepening of its competence and, consequently, in need of public support. It 
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is said to face a legitimacy crisis because democratic accountability is deficient, 
because it is too distant from the people, and because it is under-performing. 
Civil society is perceived as a remedy to the latent legitimacy crisis of the 
EU.21 Though it is a loosely defined concept, consensus has emerged on 
some core features: Civil society encompasses the wide range of voluntary 
associations that follow a ‘logic of action’ that is distinct from that of the state 
or the market or the private sphere. It encompasses all different kinds of 
organisations, ranging from solidaristic advocacy groups to member based 
interest groups. Its function is to present the plurality of interests, values and 
tastes in the setting of the political agenda and in policy making. By giving 
citizens a voice and by bringing knowledge to the decision making process, 
civil society contributes both to the input and output legitimacy of the EU 
system. Social partners have a privileged position in the system and the 
European Economic and Social Committee claims to represent organised 
civil society. This is the conception which will be tested further in our 
analysis. 
The ‘Civil Society- EU-Democracy’ Relation –  
an Analytical Model 
Above we argued in favour of three normative standards to assess the 
democratic quality of the civil society involvement in EU affairs, namely 
reciprocity, transparency/publicity and responsiveness/accountability. 
Furthermore we suggested taking civil society organisations as intermediaries 
between citizens and decision-making authorities. Thus, it is not sufficient to 
assess civil society impact in EU decision making, rather we have to analyse 
the communication and interaction up from and down to the citizens in 
                                                 
21 For a comparative evaluation of civil society as a remedy to perceived crises of legitimacy see 
Jobert/Kohler-Koch 2008. 
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order to evaluate the democratic value of civil society involvement. In the 
following section we will apply the normative standards to the third (above 
mentioned) conception of the European Union. 
Transparency and publicity are the most important functional 
preconditions for accountability. When we focus on the Commission, we can 
conceptualise two accountability relations. First, a relation of horizontal 
accountability to other EU institutions to whom the Commission is 
accountable either on political (European Parliament, Council) or legal 
(European Court of Justice) grounds. The political control by the EP is well 
established and has grown over the years. The Council does not have a 
formal right to hold the Commission on account. However, we argue that it 
is an issue of facing consequences when the Council is rejecting a 
Commission proposal. The judicial control of the ECJ is the most visible 
‘horizontal accountability’ (O’Donnell 1994). The second relation concerns 
vertical accountability which extends directly to civil society organisations 
and through their intermediary functions to the different constituencies. The 
functional role attributed to civil society organisations is to make this system 
of accountability relations work. A necessary prerequisite is the transparency 
of political decision making from agenda setting, political deliberation and 
negotiation up to the decision-making and implementation: Are documents 
and political processes visible to the attentive organisations or not? A second 
one is that nothing impedes civil society organisations to effectively push 
publicity.  
It is undeniable that much progress has been made in the previous decade 
with respect to the access to documents, the transparency of the decision 
making process by publication of legislative roadmaps, or opening comitology 
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and expert groups (Brandsma/Curtin 2007; Gornitzka/Sverdrup 2008).22 But 
it is also undeniable that this process is not yet completed, and the success 
varies from one DG to another.23 
Despite the improvement in the preconditions of accountability, civil society 
can hold the Commission to account only in a rather soft way. It may ring 
the fire-bell to promote horizontal accountability. It may pressure the 
Commission to give account in terms of feed back to civil society 
organisations in the consultation process (Commission 2007). The 
Commission up to now is not legally obliged to explain and justify its 
behaviour and will only have to face the soft consequences of ‘blaming and 
shaming’. Accordingly, we call it ‘ideational accountability’. The EU civil 
society organisations on their part have to give account to their members or 
constituencies and have to face severe consequences, either through the 
mechanism of elections or regarding donations. This we call ‘material 
accountability’. Quite obviously, the Commission does not face material 
accountability and a direct vertical link of accountability to the citizens does 
not exist at all.  
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to assess the functioning of the soft modes of 
accountability. Empirical research should focus, first, on the 
institutionalisation of different mechanisms of soft accountability and how 
they operate in daily routines. Second, responsiveness may be used as 
indicator of the effectiveness of these soft modes of accountability. 
                                                 
22 With respect to public access to documents, see EC regulation 1049/2001 and the 
Commission’s current review process of the regulation. With respect to routine decision 
making, see the Commission’s website “Your Voice in Europe” as well as the latest 
Comitology reform (Bradley, forthcoming). 
23 It is rather astonishing, that in some DG there are still undisclosed contributions to public 
consultations; contributors can demand confidential treatment for their contributions to 
online-consultations. This practice is supported by EC regulation 1049/2001, which is 
granting a right to confidentiality. 
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The analytical model presented in figure one demonstrates a two-layer 
relation of accountability/responsiveness and also a two-layer system of 
representation. On the first level, civil society organisations at the EU level 
may represent citizens’ preferences by responding to ‘signals’ (such as public 
opinion polls, media coverage of public debates) and/or to demands directly 
addressed to them either by ordinary citizens or by their members or 
supporters. ‘Electoral representation’ is limited to member based organisations 
where representatives are elected and given a mandate. On the second level, 
civil society organisations, in turn, will represent the (aggregated) preferences 
vis à vis the Commission. 
Figure 1: Democracy in the EU – a regulatory state with civil society 
involvement 
 
                “double” arrows from left to right indicate the chain of representation 
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Apart from the horizontal (political and legal) accountability and the indirect 
and soft mechanisms of vertical accountability, the Commission has a 
‘functional responsibility’ as the ‘guardian of the Treaties’, as promoter of the 
‘ever closer Union’ and as a strong supporter of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. Without a functioning mechanism of political accountability, this 
functional responsibility rests with the norm orientation of the Commission. 
The model is a heuristic devise for evaluating the contribution of civil society 
empirically. It draws attention to the distinct layers of representation and 
accountability relations and the different modes of accountability. 
Furthermore, responsiveness can be used as a proxy to measure the 
effectiveness of representation and accountability. 
Quite obviously, this model has to be put in perspective. The discourse on 
EU governance and on the benefits of civil society involvement and the 
introduction of the ‘principle of participatory democracy’ in the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty (art. 47)24 has drawn attention to the Commission’s role 
in enhancing the democratic legitimacy of the EU. But it is quite evident that 
functional representation addressed to the Commission is only one part of the 
EU’s system of ‘composite representation’ (Benz 1998). Consequently, the 
Commission’s claim to legitimately “represent the European interest” has to 
be assessed against the competing claims of the Council and the Parliament. 
They are based on different normative grounds which reflect specific political 
philosophies. Parliamentary representation is founded on the equal rights of 
citizens to partake in political rule; member state representation is founded on 
the federal principle to give political rights to (national) political entities; the 
Commission’s representation is mainly functional since it is representing 
citizens as ‘stakeholders’. Whereas representation in parliament is based on the 
idea that politics is about contested decisions and, consequently, 
                                                 
24 The Reform Treaty has retained the contents (art. 8B) but has deleted the heading. 
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representation has to be organised through competitive elections, the federal 
principle gives priority to the accommodation of competing interests between 
established political communities. Functional representation and, above all, 
the claim to representation based on CSO input has normally a technocratic 
bias: The argument is that CSOs put across the interest of stakeholders, pass 
on their expertise, and in a process of deliberation and mutual learning the 
‘co-operative state’, represented here by the Commission, will arrive at the 
best problem-solving strategy. The choice between values and irreconcilable 
interests is negated or deferred to the ‘political’ decision of the Council and 
the Parliament. 
To put it in a nutshell: When research is addressing the role of civil society 
organisations in relation to the Commission, we only get part of the picture. 
In view of the high hopes invested in civil society engagement in EU 
governance and the political importance of the EU, we consider it 
worthwhile to concentrate on this segment of the real world. 
The ‘aggregative’ path to democracy is not the only theoretically available 
option. Above we argued that reciprocity is a more appropriate normative 
standard to achieve democratic equality in the EU. This holds true when we 
accept the theoretical argument of the ‘virtue of political apathy’ and accept 
the empirical findings that only a small minority of citizens follow attentively 
the political process. Then the ‘voice of the people’ is muted and issue-
specific preferences relating to day-to-day EU politics are difficult to discern. 
The alternative ‘deliberative’ path relies on the inclusion of (all) relevant 
perspectives and fundamental beliefs, the inclusion of all relevant information 
irrespective of who is voicing these concerns and a communicative mode of 
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arguing and public reason giving which supports reciprocity.25 
Responsiveness cannot easily be measured since an empirical match with 
citizens’ preferences is not a valid indicator. Rather we have to look for 
institutional conditions which encourage receptiveness and reasoning. A 
further hypothesis is that the character of deliberation will vary with the 
relative political weight of the actors involved. When civil society 
organisations have ‘ownership’ in the sense that they have a dominant 
influence on the agenda and on the institutional setting of the exchange, the 
nature of deliberation will be more political, whereas if the Commission is in 
control, deliberation will tend to be more technocratic. 
                                                
 
Assessing the Democratic Value of Civil Society 
Engagement in the European Union –  
First Empirical Insights 
The previous parts of this paper made clear, our approach to assessing the 
democratic quality of civil society engagement in the EU argues for a rather 
complex picture, analysing three normative principles and a variety of 
possible institutional localizations. The theoretical point is: There can be a 
democratization of the EU via civil society involvement, but this is or would 
be a rather thorny road. And if a significant democratization has taken place 
remains an empirical question. The answer mostly depends on the actual 
 
25 A rather new approach of the Commission is to include citizens directly by promoting 
certain ‘demotic’ instruments, as deliberative polls (“Tomorrow’s Europe”) or “European 
Citizens’ Consultations”. These instruments have the status of hypothetical opinion polls: How 
would the European citizens assess the EU, if they are induced to make an assessment. As these 
proceedings normally don’t get any wider public attention, these instruments can not solve the 
EU’ legitimacy problem: If the European citizens are not aware of it, even strong 
representative and deliberative efforts can not gain citizens’ support and thus legitimacy. But 
these instruments may have other values which, however, are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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practice of civil society involvement.26 To be precise, four elements have to 
be integrated in such a complex, but feasible analysis: 
 
First, with respect to the normative dimension, we have argued that the EU 
performance has to be assessed in a more integrative way, where a set of 
normative principles (as political equality, publicity, and accountability) has to 
be put in a common perspective. 
Second, with respect to the democratic quality of institutions and processes of 
civil society involvement we made clear that to effectively include 
representatives and/or political claims of civil society organisations is not 
sufficient in order to democratize any political system. These representatives 
and claims have also to be connected in appropriate ways to the society, e.g. 
to public discourses, to processes of political authorization and accountability. 
Third, sometimes scholars assess the democratic quality of single institutions 
of civil society involvement. But there are many formal and informal 
instruments and channels connecting civil society organisations to EU 
institutions and a satisfactory assessment would have to aggregate the results 
from the different instruments. 
And fourth, the institutions of civil society involvement have to be integrated 
into a wider picture of EU democracy, in which European elections, the EP, 
and democratic national governments share the democratic burdens. 
Except for the last aspect mentioned, we currently work on such a more 
complex analysis in our DEMOCIV project at the MZES. As we detailed 
empirical results are not available yet, we finally give some hints about the 
democratic quality of the EU’s civil society involvement by putting - very 
 
26 Hopefully next year we can present the findings of the most relevant details of this picture, 
which we analyse in our DFG- research project. Here we present only some preliminary 
results. 
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roughly - the Commission’s instruments in the perspective of our theoretical 
framework. 
Since the White Paper on European Governance, a permanent extension of 
participatory options has taken place. This has lowered the thresholds for civil 
society organisations to participate in European affairs. But even this extended 
involvement is by no means equal – neither with respect to the national 
origin of the contributors, nor with respect to the representation of political 
claims (Persson 2007; Quittkat/Finke in this volume). 
Though opportunities to participate in EU consultations have increased, a 
thorough analysis of participation in the different stages of the decision-
making process - from agenda setting, deliberation and negotiation, up to the 
final decision making act - reveals a mixed picture. The Commission holds 
the agenda setting power; it may use the Treaty based right of initiative in 
response to member governments or interest groups. Even though in 
particular instances organisations representing broader civil society interests 
have an impact on the agenda, it does not amount to open and equal access 
and, therefore, can hardly be qualified as being ‘democratic’. There is neither 
a transparency nor an accountability mechanism with respect to the agenda 
control. When it comes to civil society input in the process of policy 
formulation and decision-making, the principles of openness and participation 
apply and instruments have been introduced that have broadened access and 
voice. But institutionalised accountability is lacking. Though individual 
General Directorates, such as GD SANCO, have been open to a political 
commitment to give feed-back in the consultation process and to give reasons 
for its deviating positions, in practise it is mostly a rather superficial exercise. 
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When reading the documents, it is difficult to discern any deliberative use of 
the arguments put forward in the consultation process with civil society.27 
Nevertheless, it has to be acknowledged that due to the extended 
consultation process the policy formulation stage is more open than before 
and more participatory than in many member states. Information is easily 
accessible and a diversity of positions may be voiced. The exchange of ideas, 
however, is channelled by a predominantly technocratic approach: The 
Commission is inviting expert opinion on optimal problem-solving strategies. 
Whereas parliamentary decision-making relies on competition over political 
issues, the Commission shies away from ‘politisation’. Thus, open public 
consultations do not make a market place of political concerns and ideas. 
Many written consultations read more like an effort to mobilise support than 
to invite different views. Only a limited range of options, if at all, is presented 
and a competitive evaluation of different policy proposals is not part of the 
process. It would be unfair to attribute this practise to a manipulative 
inclination of the Commission. It is rather the expression of the institutional 
position of the Commission which has to arrive at a consensual position that 
will meet the assent of the Council. 
To conclude: Involving civil society does not live up to the promises of 
rendering the EU more democratic. The instruments have enlarged 
participation in terms of providing access, but hardly in terms of providing 
citizens with influence on outcome. Information and transparency have been 
improved, but do not enhance a public discourse. ‘Participatory engineering’ 
cannot overcome the structural impediments that keep a trans-national public 
sphere weak and citizens apathetic.  
 
27 The same holds true for the impact assessments which are obligatory for important legislative 
processes. On average, a discussion even of the most relevant civil society contributions (esp. 
critical claims) does not become visible to the reader. At best the overall support for a 
Commission’s proposal is counted. For an empirical assessment of the Commission’s 
responsiveness in the REACH case, see Friedrich (2008: 155ff.). 
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